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In his most recent book on the concept of “responsibility to protect”, 
one of the world’s leading experts on the issue, Alex Bellamy, has cha-
racterized the Cuban position as part of “a tiny handful of doctrinaire 
states” who do it “for ideological reasons (it suits the anti-imperialist 
rhetoric of Venezuela and Cuba, for instance)”(Bellamy, 2014: 4 & 12).
In the present paper I will attempt to deconstruct this narrative that 
paints Cuba in the worst possible light. I will argue that the position 
of Havana can better be explained on the basis of the general charac-
terization of its foreign policy as having the following main features:
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 As a significant member of the Global South, which takes into 
account not only its narrow national interests and preferences, 
but also the interests of the Non-Aligned countries of the so-
called Third World.
As an anti-hegemonic actor that opposes the domination of the world 
order by a sole superpower or a small combination of powers who claim 
to have a monopolistic, morally based set of values and norms that 
must be applied by and to the rest of the international community. 
This conception of a main principle of Cuban foreign policy is deeply 
embedded in the political culture of Cuba as the result of bitter his-
torical experiences.
As a State that has incorporated into its international practice the 
best legacies of humanitarianism, demonstrated by its contribution 
to the ending of apartheid and colonialism in Africa, to South-South 
Cooperation and to the common toil against natural disasters.
As a small but significant powerbroker who has been ready to build 
bridges and contribute to the solution of major conflicts and crisis 
involving threats to large populations.
Cuba’s historical experience has made it a victim and/or potential 
victim of genocidal policies carried out by great powers, who have used 
coercion and threats to impose their will on Cuban society with terrible 
consequences for its people, mostly using humanitarian excuses for 
their attitudes. Many authors, including Bellamy, contend that one of 
the historical sources of RtoP lie in the United States involvement in 
Cuba’s War of Independence in 1898, misinterpreting the real sources 
of that unilateral self-interested intervention and underestimating the 
negative consequences it had for the Cuban nation. See for example 
the essay by Mike Sewell, titled “Humanitarian intervention, demo-
cracy, and imperialism: the American war with Spain, 1898, and after” 
in one of the most consulted works on humanitarian intervention, the 
concept that lies at the origin of “responsibility to protect” (Simms 
and Trim, 2011: 303-322). 
Many authors, including Bellamy himself, have recognized that “res-
ponsibility to protect” was a development of the controversial concept 
of “humanitarian intervention” elaborated by the International Com-
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mission on Humanitarian Intervention and Sovereignty, which failed 
dismally in attempting to undermine the main principle of internatio-
nal law (state sovereignty) in favor of the so-called “human security”. 
That argument is present in works by Johnson (2014), Pattison (2010), 
Simms &Trimm (2011), and Weiss (2013).
As Noam Chomsky has shown, “virtually every use of force in in-
ternational affairs has been justified in terms of RtoP, including 
the worst monsters” (Cunliffe, 2011: 11). Chomsky points out that 
historically, “Japan’s 1931 attack on Manchuria, Mussolini’s 1935 
invasion of Ethiopia, and Hitler’s occupation of parts of Czechos-
lovakia in 1938,” were“all accompanied by lofty rhetoric about the 
solemn responsibility to protect the suffering populations, and factual 
justifications”(Chomsky, 2011: 11).
I will also demonstrate that the Cuban position on RtoP has also been 
the object of an updating between 2005 and 2014. In 2005-2006 and 
to a certain extent in July, 2009, at the Plenary Meeting of the 63rd 
Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations regarding the 
report of the Secretary General A163167 “Implementing the Respon-
sibility to Protect”, Cuba’s position was radical, criticizing not only 
the concept but also the general tendencies of global governance 
present at the time, when the Bush administration was carrying out 
what some authors have characterized as “America Unbound” (Daalder 
and Lindsay, 2003).
The Cuban position on the issue was manifested for the first time in 
the Non Aligned Movement Statement on Responsibility to Protect 
delivered by Malaysia to the United Nations in April 2005 (Non Aligned 
Movement, 2005: 1): 
“On the intended concepts of ‘responsibility to protect’ and 
‘human security’, Cuba’s position has not changed. In the pre-
sent world’s condition they would only facilitate interference, 
pressures and intervention in the internal affairs of our States 
by the big powers, in overt and constant threat to our peoples’ 
right to self-determination. Cuba reiterates its firm repudiation 
to the attempt of approval of these concepts, which only serve 
the interest of those who make millionaire profits with wars. 
Lately, there has been a trend to designate the so-called ‘failed 
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states’, whose political instability could put the security of the 
rich and powerful at risk, and which would have to be applied 
the naive recipe of ‘responsibility to protect’ and respect for 
‘human security’. These so-called ‘failed states’ appear on a 
list recently published by a well-known magazine on inter-
national politics, where 60 of us, including some that will be 
surprised for being included in such an exclusive group, appear 
as threats according to 12 arbitrarily manipulated indicators” 
(Non-Aligned Movement, 2005: 1).
Three aspects of the above statement should be commented in the 
framework of the present article. In the first place the reference to the 
conditions existing at the time in world politics, a context in which, in 
Cuba’s view, the acceptance of the idea of “responsibility to protect” 
could only serve to“facilitate interference, pressures and intervention 
in the internal affairs of our States by the big powers, in overt and 
constant threat to our peoples’ right to self-determination.” 
In 2005, the American war in Iraq had been going on already for two 
years. The way that the war was unleashed and conducted proved the 
point that Cuba was making. The United States acted unilaterally 
without approval from the United Nations Security Council and alle-
ging, among other things, the human rights violations of which the 
Saddam regime was responsible.The war in Iraq was not only justified 
under false pretenses, but also caused enormous human suffering. 
(Chomsky and Achcar, 2007: 83-122).
Cuba felt threatened when the George W. Bush administration insi-
nuated that Havana would be in a category of countries very similar 
to the Axis of Evil. In 2003, the same year that the U.S. launched the 
invasion of Iraq, Washington created a Commission for the Assistance 
to a Free Cuba, presided over by Colin Powell. The following year, As-
sistant Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security 
Affairs, John R. Bolton, falsely accused Cuba of maintaining a biological 
weapons program, an accusation very similar to the one made against 
Iraq. And in 2006 Bush created the position of Coordinator for a Cuban 
Transition in the State Department. 
The latter step seemed to be designed to have already in place an offi-
cial that would play in Cuba the same role that General Jay Gardner 
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did in Iraq during the initial stage of the military occupation. If there 
was any doubt, Bob Woodward’s third installment of his Bush at War 
trilogy in 2006 confirmed that at the White House the President and 
some of his advisers had towards Havana a similar mindset that led to 
the invasion of Iraq. The following dialog was included in Woodward’s 
book when Gardner returned from Baghdad and was invited to the 
Oval Office to pay his respects to the President:
“As Garner got up to leave, (Condoleezza) Rice stopped him 
and extended her hand. ‘Jay, you’ve got to stay in touch with 
us,’ she said.
“‘I’d like to,’ Garner said, thinking to himself, How the hell 
am I going to do that? After all, he only talked with Rumsfeld.
“On the way out, Bush slapped Garner on the back. “Hey, Jay, 
you want to do Iran?
“‘Sir, the boys and I talked about that and we want to hold 
out for Cuba. We think the rum and cigars are a little better 
. . . The women are prettier.
“Bush laughed. ‘You got it. You got Cuba”’ (Woodward, 2006: 
224).
As shown, what Bellamy calls the ideological anti-imperialist rhetoric of 
Cuba was really a practical conclusion from the available evidence: the 
country could be invaded alleging any excuse and the “responsibility 
to protect” could be the perfect alibi with the right manipulation of 
the information. 
The second point raised by the Cuban statement was precisely related 
to the issue of media control and manipulation. By pointing out that 
an influential foreign policy journal had drawn a list of 60 failed states, 
mostly from the Global South, public opinion could be maneuvered 
into accepting military intervention, in violation of sovereignty, under 
the pretext of humanitarian action. 
Cuban historical experience pointed in that direction. Most historians 
of the Spanish-Cuban-American War of 1898 coincide in pointing 
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out that the American intervention in Cuba’s War of Independence 
(1895-1898) was made possible because the advancement of this 
clearly imperialist project was masked under the shroud of what was 
seen then as a responsibility to protect the small countries of the 
Caribbean, and in that way, turn public opinion in favor of a war that 
was not considered initially necessary.  Cuban-American scholar Louis 
A. Pérez Jr. has argued:
“Central to the proposition of the American imperial project 
was precisely the notion of duty: the necessity to discharge a 
higher moral obligation mandated by providential design for 
the greater good of humanity”(Perez, 2008: 264). 
The last point raised by the Cuban statement was more implicit 
than explicit. It was the questioning of the proposition that an idea 
like the “responsibility to protect” could be effectively implemented 
in an international system in which the asymmetries of power give 
broad possibilities of action to large Nation-States which, in general, 
determine the course of events. And this idea is neither really new nor 
doctrinaire. As political philosophers have emphasized over time, the 
old dictum that “it is the law of nature that the strong do what they 
can and that the weak do what they must” is very much the standard 
procedure of power politics (Ryan, 2012: 24).
This reality of world politics was clearly demonstrated when the con-
cept of “responsibility to protect” was presented in paragraphs 138 and 
139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome. The circumstances of this 
decision and document approval have been controversial. There was 
no concrete and specific discussion of these paragraphs. They were in-
cluded in a 40 page, 178-paragraph document that was adopted hastily 
under the pretext that the Millennium Summit had to be brought to 
a close. The Cuban delegation, headed by Ricardo Alarcón, complai-
ned about this decision, but the Venezuelan President, Hugo Chávez, 
formulated the strongest criticism.1 As Cuban delegates have argued 
again and again in different United Nations reviews and debates, the 
approval of that document does not constitute necessarily the accep-
tance of the “responsibility to protect” as a new norm in international 
relations. For it to be so, it would require a concrete approval by the 
General Assembly of the United Nations.
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It is paradoxical that in 2005 two events demonstrated Cuba’s altruistic 
internationalist solidarity foreign policy. One was the sending of 2,400 
physicians and health workers to Pakistan to help with the humanita-
rian crisis provoked by the Kashmir earthquake. The second one was the 
offer to send a similar amount of emergency assistant medical teams to 
New Orleans to help with the wake of the Katrina Hurricane. It could 
be argued that in this latter case the U.S. government demonstrated 
incapacity in assuming the “responsibility to protect” a large human 
group from a natural disaster.
In 2006, Cuba’s position on the subject hardened. Inaugurating a 
meeting of Foreign Ministers of Non-Aligned countries in Havana 
in September, Vice-president Carlos Lage was radical in his criticism 
of “human security” and the “responsibility to protect” describing 
them as “concepts that hide the intention of violating sovereignty 
and mutilating Independence, of poor countries, of course, never of 
the powerful” (Lage, 2006).
From that early beginning, Cuban officials have been making im-
portant contributions to the debate on “responsibility to protect”, as 
shown in the above-mentioned contribution of 2009 and in positions 
explained by the Cuban Mission to the United Nations in 2012, 2013 
and 2014. The following paragraphs will highlight the questions raised 
by Cuba in documents supplied to the author by the Cuban Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs (MINREX) listed in the sources below.
At the Plenary Meeting of the 63rd Session of the General Assem-
bly, on July 23, 2009, discussing the report of the Secretary General 
(A1631677), the First Secretary of the Cuban Mission, Anet PinoRive-
ro, began by pointing out the obvious: “The notion of responsibility to 
protect does not exist as a legal obligation provided in any instrument 
of the International Law or in the Charter of the United Nations” 
(Cuban Mission to the UN, 2009: 1).
She immediately raised the main objection of Cuba to the concept 
in the following terms:
“Although we recognize the responsibility of each State to 
promote and protect all the human rights of its people, we are 
concerned about the proliferation of ambiguous and similar 
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terms that, under an indiscriminate humanitarian image,entail 
in practice a violation of the principle of sovereignty of States, 
and in general of the Charter of the United Nations and the 
International Law. The so call ‘humanitarian intervention’ as 
well as the ancient ‘temporary interposition’ from the begin-
ning of XX century should be remembered” (Cuban Mission 
to the UN, 2009: 1).
Reaffirming that “Sovereignty” lies as the cornerstone of the interna-
tional system as on of the main principles contained in the Charter of 
the United Nations, the Cuban delegate went on to state: “Without 
it, there could be no United Nations and the small countries of the 
Southwould be abandoned at the mercy of the large and strong ones” 
(Cuban Mission to the UN, 2009: 1).
Challenging the idea that a new concept was required to make the 
United Nations more effective in cases of humanitarian crises, Ms. 
Pino argued:
“Claiming the principle of Sovereignty has hindered the 
actions of the United Nationsto come to the aid of suffering 
humanity is to distort the truth. The inefficiency of the 
Organization is sometimes caused by, inter alia, the lack of 
political will, selectivity and double standards, development 
resources constraints, and dysfunction in the working of some 
of its bodies as the Security Council” (Cuban Mission to the 
UN, 2009: 1).
The Cuban delegate pointed out a clear procedural precedent, namely 
that issues of humanitarian character are in the purview of the General 
Assembly and its Economic and Social Council and not in the Secu-
rity Council, whose composition and activities have been challenged 
anyway. Assigning to the Security Council the attribute of deciding on 
humanitarian crises, which is what the concept of  “responsibility to 
protect” entails, would be a significant modification of the spirit and 
the letter of the Charter, a step that cannot be accomplished without 
a broad and profound debate at the General Assembly.
Cuba repudiates genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes 
against humanity, but believes that the General Assembly is the proper 
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forum to deeply analyze and take decisions on them. Only through that 
procedure can the United Nations approach these issues in a legitimate 
and consensual manner (Cuban Mission to the UN, 2009: 1-2).
The Cuban delegate then went on to raise some questions, among 
them the following: 
Who is to decide if there is an urgent need for an intervention 
in a given State, according to what criteria, in what framework, 
and on the basis of what conditions?
Who decides it is evident the authorities of a State do not 
protect their people, and how is it decided? 
Who determines peaceful means are not adequate in a certain 
situation, and on what criteria? 
Do small States have also the right and the actual prospect of 
interfering in the affairs of larger States? 
Would any developed country allow, either in principle or in 
practice, humanitarian intervention in its own territory?
How and where do we draw the line between an intervention 
under the “Responsibility to Protect” and an intervention for 
political or strategic purposes, and when do political conside-
rations prevail over humanitarian conditions? 
How can we believe the ‘good faith’ of the powers which wage 
wars of aggression against othernations? 
Is saving an ethnic group from an ethnic cleansing by killing 
the other party, legal and ethical? 
When do foreign forces of occupation withdraw? 
When does the violation of the sovereignty of a countrycease? 
(Cuban Mission to the UN, 2009: 3).
Cuba also pointed out the following evident fact: “The language agreed 
at the 2005 World Summit on the responsibility to protect did not 
turn said term into a concept or a standard of law.”At the same time, 
Ms. Pino underlined the ambiguity of the term and the questions it 
raised, proposing a two step approach to consider and adopt it: “First, 
we should provide a joint answer to its legal loopholes, and then review 
Cuba and RtoP: A critical approach from a  
humanitarian anti-hegemonic Global South powerbroker
PE
N
SA
M
IE
N
TO
 P
RO
PI
O
 4
1
234
the viability of the concept if theMember States so consider” (Cuban 
Mission to the UN, 2009: 3).
On 12 July 2011, Ambassador Rodolfo Benítez Verson, Cuban Depu-
ty Permanent Representative to the United Nations participated in 
the interactive debate on the responsibility to protect at the Plenary 
Meeting of the General Assembly. Once more, the Cuban delegation 
objected to the attempts at implementing the concept “even before 
it is clearly defined and agreed on by the General Assembly. The 
debates on this matter held in recent years by the General Assembly 
and the procedural resolution adopted in 2009 have clearly revealed 
the diversity of positions.”
Ambassador Benítez reminded the General Assembly the legal issues 
raised by Cuba in 2009 and went on to state: “It is obvious there is still 
a long road ahead in order to achieve a consensus on this matter. The 
General Assembly must continue to be the center of future discussions. 
The other bodies of the system, including the Security Council and the 
Secretariat, must refrain from taking steps on their own in this regard.”
Once more, he pointed out the main risk in giving to the Security 
Council such an interventionist instrument: “There is a real danger 
that the Responsibility to Protect may end up being  manipulated by 
covered interventionists seeking to justify in different manners inter-
ference and the use of force.History has repeatedly shown us examples 
of wars of conquest waged with thepretext of protecting civilians.”
The examples that the Cuban delegate pointed out were evident in 
the cases of Iraq and Afghanistan, but especially in Libya:
“Over one million innocent civilians in Iraq and more than 
70 thousand in Afghanistan have died as a result of these 
actions. Civilian deaths in these wars account for over 90% 
of the casualties. The proportion of children in this data is 
horrendous and unprecedented. Undoubtedly, the concept 
of Responsibility to Protect can be easily manipulated; suffice 
it to observe the current situation in Libya.Without exhaus-
ting all diplomatic instruments, and without even trying to 
use peaceful means, at present NATO is unjustifiably using 
its most state-of-the-art and lethal armaments in Libya. The 
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bombing by the Alliance kills the very civilians they are sup-
posed to protect.”
He also recalled another issue raised by Cuba before, the question of 
double standards: 
“Selectivity and double-standards prevailing today only reinfor-
ce our concerns on the Responsibility to Protect. While NATO 
attacks Libya, the Security Council abandons its responsibi-
lities and remains indifferent to the constant aggression  and 
the mass atrocities in the occupied Palestinian Territories.It 
is evident that, by maintaining its current composition and 
working methods, theSecurity Council can in no way ensure 
a non-abusive and non-selective action when implementing 
the Responsibility to Protect.”
He ended by summarizing the essence of the Cuban position in the 
following paragraphs:
“The principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-
interference in the internal affairs of States, must be upheld at 
all cost, for without them, the United Nations cannot survive, 
and small and weak nations would be left at the mercy of larger 
and stronger nations.
“Cuba opposes, and will categorically oppose, any use of force 
that is not included in the provisions of the Charter, for which 
there can be no justification. A more primitive one, based on 
the reinterpretation of the Charter and the International Law, 
cannot succeed the current unjust and deeply unequal global 
order” (Cuban Mission to the UN, 2011).
The final document that reflects Havana’s position on this purported 
new international norm is the Official Statement of the of the Delega-
tion of Cuba at the Interactive Dialogue on Responsibility to Protect 
as presented at the General Assembly Plenary Session of 8 September 
2014 (Ministerio de RelacionesExteriores, 2014). On this occasion 
the Cuban delegation chose to begin with an unprecedented sharp 
declaration:  “Cuba reaffirms its strong condemnation of the crimes 
denounced by the 2005 Summit (Paragraphs 138 and 139): genocide, 
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war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, anywhere 
that they might happen or in any of its manifestations.”
However, Cuba reiterated its opinion that “there is no clearly negotia-
ted or consensual intergovernmental agreement by the Member States 
on the scope, implications and possible forms of implementation of 
the concept ‘responsibility to protect’.”  Therefore, in the opinion of 
Havana, until that happens, it is not possible to invoke it in any kind 
of military actions by single or multiple actors.
In the present world context, according to Cuba, there are not objective 
or subjective conditions that would prevent the use by major powers 
of “responsibility to protect” as a pretext to interfere in the internal 
affairs of smaller states or for the use of force and military interven-
tion with hegemonic pretenses. The document subject to the debate 
(A/68/947–S/2014/449) does not solve some very important legal issues 
that would guarantee objectivity, impartiality and non-selectivity in 
its application.
The Cuban delegation insisted in its previous demand for a broad, 
honest, inclusive and transparent debate on this issue at the General 
Assembly and on the defense of the position that “the responsibility 
to protect” concept should be based in the express recognition of 
sovereignty, self-determination, independence, territorial integrity 
and non-interference in the domestic affairs of Nation States. That 
is the only way in which small nations with limited resources can be 
protected from the free action of more powerful states.
Conclusion
Far from been doctrinaire and ideologically motivated, the Cuban 
position on the “responsibility to protect” concept is solidly based in 
legal, historical and political considerations associated with its histo-
rical experience and traditional anti-hegemonic foreign policy. It also 
represents a valid criticism from the Global South.
The risks of implementing the “responsibility to protect” are evident 
in the last 10 years, Libya been the example that reflects what can 
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happen if its use is left to the powerful countries that have been trying 
to impose an hegemonic order in the world which can have only one 
result: the same kind of humanitarian crises and crimes that it is sup-
posedly designed to prevent.
In the period object of this analysis, Cuba has demonstrated that it is 
an active member of the international community with humanitarian 
concerns and with a humanitarian practice that is rarely seen in coun-
tries with similarly limited resources. Examples abound: Havana has 
cooperated, even with big nations like the United States, in solving 
humanitarian disaster in countries like Pakistan, Haiti, Sierra Leone, 
Liberia and Guinea. At the same time it has promoted the proclama-
tion of Latin America and the Caribbean as a Zone of Peace at the 
Summit of the Latin American and Caribbean Community of States 
in Havana in January 2014. Finally, it is actively cooperating with 
Norway in mediating a peace agreement that will end the long conflict 
in Colombia, which has caused much human suffering.
One important concluding point is that Cuba has not shied away from 
been an active participant in the debates on the subject and has been 
constantly renovating its position, demonstrating once more the main 
trait that has emerged from the conduct of its foreign police in the last 
ten years, its constant updating. In the last debate on “responsibility 
to protect”, while Havana recognized the importance of condemning 
and addressing the crimes described in paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 
2005 World Summit Outcome document, it underlined the main risk 
in not having a broad, honest, transparent and profound debate on 
the issue at the General Assembly.
That continuous updating of Cuba’s position on “responsibility to 
protect” will undoubtedly be reinforced with the new stage opened 
by Presidents Raúl Castro and Barack Obama on 17 December 2014. 
On that occasion, both leaders emphasized that they will search for 
ways to cooperate in multilateral organizations on the basis of mutual 
respect for their differences. That is a positive development.
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NOTES
1 See Cumbre de la ONU y su declaración final defraudaron al mundo, 
http://www.ain.cu/2005/septiembre/sep16iggonu05.htm
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